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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present an analysis of the new theorem by Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph
(PBR) concerning ontic and epistemic hidden variables in quantum mechanics [1, 2]. This is a kind
of review and defense of my previous critical analysis done in the context of Bohmian mechanics.
This is also the occasion for me to review some of the fundamental aspects of Bohmian theory
rarely discussed in the literature.
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I. A NOT TOO ‘BOHRING’ INTRODUCTION TO BOHM (I HOPE)
I am a Bohmian (i.e. a ‘de Broglian’) which means somebody believing in the pertinence
of the pilot wave theory proposed by de Broglie in 1926-27 and rediscovered by Rosen in 1945
and Bohm in 1952 (see the book by Holland [3]). What is pilot wave theory? A completely
deterministic and neat approach at the fundamental level involving trajectories and dynam-
ical laws for point-like quanta (at least in its original version). This quantum interpretation
which contrasts with the one proposed by Bohr Heisenberg and others is done in such a way
as to agree completely with quantum mechanics rules and in particular is tuned to repro-
duce every statistical prediction given by the usual formalism (this is why we speak about an
interpretation of the quantum formalism). The theory works not only for a single particle,
but also for systems of several entangled objects (even though entanglement was not clearly
defined in 1927) such as particle beams or molecules. Furthermore, the theory is completely
nonlocal in the sense defined by Bell with his famous theorem of 1965. Therefore, the theory
although deterministic is able to describe subtle quantum effects such as correlations (i.e.,
the EPR paradox) and interferences (i.e., the wave particle duality) and provides a clear
ontology for understanding the quantum world by solving all the measurement paradoxes.
The reaction to this proposition was from the beginning very emotional and the theory of
de Broglie and Bohm was often named ‘metaphysical’ or ‘ideological superstructure’ and
even recently accused of being ‘surrealistic’ (see for example refs. [4, 5]). The main reasons
for the strong opposition is that pilot wave says that things which are not experimentally
determinable are however determined in a very precise way by dynamical laws (the so called
guidance equations of de Broglie). But, since the pilot wave agrees with quantum mechanics
it should also certainly accept the Heisenberg uncertainty and the results concerning wave
particle duality with the double-hole experiment. How could that be? Indeed, pilot wave
agrees with all that but in a very peculiar way. To understand that, I remind you briefly
what is the point of view of Bohr and Heisenberg on this topic. The argumentation focuses
on the famous double-hole interference experiment done with single electron or photon and
which shows that a particle could be influenced by the hole through which it is not going
to pass in order to create an interference pattern. This is a kind of paradox if we try to
think in term of a particle path going from only one hole and which ‘obviously’ should not
care about the ‘remote’ presence of the second hole. For Bohr and Heisenberg this paradox
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should be removed. ‘Fortunately’, they wrote, the presence of the ‘particle’, i.e., the ‘trajec-
tory’ can not be detected at both holes without disturbing the fringes. Therefore, at least at
the experimental level, no contradiction like to be at A and not at A at the same time can
occur. Bohr and Heisenberg emphasize that the result is actually worst that a naive picture
of the uncertainty principle could apriori let us to believe. Indeed, this naive semi-classical
picture would say that the measurement always disturbs but that ‘OK we could still may-be
preserve, at least conceptually, trajectories even if they are hidden’. However, quantum me-
chanics predicts that even a very small interaction which localize the particle, say in only one
arm of an interferometer but not in the other (the spatial precision is not so huge here since
the interferometer can be very big), will disturb and destroy the subsequent fringes. There-
fore, it seems that hypothetical trajectories have no meaning in the experimental world, and
since they can not be investigated they are metaphysical. Quantum mechanics textbooks
are full of examples like the previous one discussed either in term of momentum ‘kicks’ a`
la Heisenberg or Feynman or involving more sophisticated devices and entanglement ma-
chineries. All the practitioners of the orthodox school generally emphasize that there is no
other choice: in the quantum world we have to abandon our habits our clean logics and
accept that things can not be fully described by the classical categories such as position
X(t) and velocity X˙(t) characterizing locally the system and evolving deterministically with
time. Following Bohr and his complementarity principle one must choose which variable we
want to experimentally define and we can then unambiguously calculate the probability of
occurrence for such events using the quantum rules. However, these experimental contexts
sometimes exclude each other (i.e., they are complementary like for example experimental
arrangements for measuring either x and p for a same particle) and we must definitely re-
nounce to our classical illusions such as trajectories and paths existing independently of the
observation. Of course, the time evolution X(t) disappears completely from the discussion
and we are allowed only to speak about the probability dP (X, t) to observe the system with
the value X at the time t. If we don’t measure X then it has no actualized reality; it was
only a potentiality at the given time t. The subsequent evolution of the then undisturbed
wave-function |Ψ(t′)〉 will give other potentialities at a future time t′ which again will or not
be actualized in our experimental world depending on your will to measure it or not.
If experimentally you can not determine a trajectory with a too large precision, i.e., at
least nor large enough to observe both the path and fringes with a same particle, what could
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be the interest of such a pilot wave dynamics? This is a clear drawback of the Bohmian
approach and it explains why it was so attacked strongly by Heisenberg, Pauli and many
others. Although pilot wave solves in a neat way the measurement problem by fixing an
ontology it also brings us parameters which somehow stay ‘hidden’ and therefore apparently
metaphysical. However, I think this reaction exaggerated. First, we could remark that
Heisenberg and Bohr are not completely fair concerning trajectories when they say that
these paths have no existence. Actually, they go too far since their claim can not be proven
either and are even contradicted by the pilot wave mere existence (as it was emphasized
by de Broglie and Bohm in 1951-52). In particular, it is important to remind that von
Neumann demonstrated in the 1930’s a famous theorem forbidding the existence of such a
kind of hidden variable model and until the 1980’s it was often quoted as a final impossi-
bility proof for the existence of trajectories, even though pilot wave was already a counter
example, and even after Grete Hermann and later John Bell showed that the axiomatic of
the theorem is not general enough to get to the von Neumann expected theorem. I think
that the Copenhagen interpretation should be amended seriously at least on that point by
replacing the world non existent by something like experimentally hidden without breaking
the fringe coherence. But is this really true? Are particle paths completely hidden at the
experimental level? This is not actually totally the case. In recent years much more was
written on weak values as defined by Aharonov, Albert and Vaidman [6] and in particular
on the possibility to identify a certain weak value Aw with the velocity field X˙(t) attributed
precisely by the pilot wave to the particle located at X(t). Actually, this was experimentally
demonstrated [7] showing that the Bohmian trajectories can have an experimental reality.
There is however no contradiction with what was find and discussed before. The trick is
indeed to realize that a weak measurement is not done on a single individual unlike the
strong projective measurement. Weak measurement is weak and requires a large population
of particles to get the trajectories. Therefore, in all these examples the Heisenberg prin-
ciple stays valid: we can not detect fringes and path for a same particle. Therefore, the
sentence experimentally hidden means in reality experimentally hidden at the single particle
level. But, I would like to point out that even this apparently prudent analysis is not ex-
empt of critics. Indeed, beside the weak measurement protocol Aharonov and Vaidman also
defined what they called a protective measurement protocol [8]. This is a very interesting
method focussing on the fact that in some conditions we can define a system S evolving
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very slowly and gently (i.e. adiabatically) which can be coupled to a meter which evolves
very strongly into a well distinguishable state. The result of the protocol will not give us a
way to record precisely the spectrum of an observable A of the system (i.e. unlike in a von
Neumann protocol) but either, will give us the new possibility to measure its average value
〈ψS|A|ψS〉. This is very interesting in the context of pilot wave for several reasons. First,
since 〈A〉 can be for example the probability density ρ(X0) = 〈ψS|X0〉〈X0|ψS〉 or the current
J(X0) = 〈ψS[|X0〉〈X0|P−P|X0〉〈X0|]/(2mi)|ψS〉 of the particle (with mass m) at point X0,
one could at first argue (like in ref. [9]) that the protocol proves once again the surrealistic
nature of the Bohmian trajectories. Indeed, the protective measurement protocol can be
used to ‘detect’ the particle at points where the Bohmian particle never approaches. This
reasoning is based on the fact that for a real wave function 〈X|ψS〉 the Bohmian particle is
not moving at all (i.e., X˙(t) = 0) so that even if the particle is fixed at position X1 6= X0
the protective measurement will allow to measure ρ(X0). How could that be? Although I
will not here answer to that in details I can provide a simple qualitative explanation: par-
ticle is not everything in the pilot wave. For a Bohmian the wave is also a fundamental
ingredient so that the force exerted on a particle depends not only on the ‘contact’ potential
proposed in ref. [9] but also on a quantum potential which can acts in some non classical but
completely deterministic way. This is enough to justify how the dynamics of the pointer is
affected in some nonlocal way by the quantum interaction. I actually developed a complete
Bohmian reasoning in [10] as a reply to ref. [9], see also the forthcoming chapter in the Book
‘Protective Measurement and Quantum Reality’ edited by Shan Gao [29]). There is how-
ever an other reason why protective measurement is interesting in the context of Bohmian
mechanics. Although I didn’t emphasized that point enough in the past this is actually
much more important. Indeed, protective measurement is done at the single particle level
which means that even a single pointer measurement allows us to determine ρ(X0) or J(X0).
But since the operators associated with ρ(X0) or J(X0) commute actually nothing forbid
us to measure ρ(X0) and J(X0) together (for example with two pointers). But now, for a
Bohmian this is a bit of magic because we have a way to measure at the single particle level
the ratio J(X0)/ρ(X0) which is nothing else that the particle velocity. It is thus not anymore
justified to say that the Bohmian velocity is not an observable. Of course in someway the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle is not in question since the protective measurement is not
a projective detection of the particle position at X0. We don’t have access to the actual
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trajectory followed by the particle because knowing the velocity is not enough: we should
also have the actual position but this would require a projective method. However, we could
imagine the following operations: first make a protective measurement to obtain the velocity
at X0, then measure projectively for the same particle its position X. Subsequently, retain
only those cases where the projective measurement gives X = X0. We have thus both the
particle and velocity for the same particle at the same time! Note that the future evolution
will be however random since the projective measurement is very intrusive. Still, this result
is I think remarkable. I point out that it relies on the definition of the time scales involved
in the process. Indeed, if by protective we mean adiabatic and very slow then the complete
two-measurements procedure proposed here will have only meaning if the Bohmian velocity
is very small so that it will still makes perfectly sense to speak about a velocity and position
recorded at the same time for one particle.
There are other reasons for defending Bohmian mechanics. One of them is that it pro-
vides finally a kind of intelligibility which is absent from the Copenhagen interpretation.
Indeed, since for Bohr we can not say anything about the system between measurements,
it means, like it was shown by Wigner, that an observer can stays in a ubiquitous quantum
state without clean ontological status before a second observer finalizes his experiment. How
could that be and what does it mean? If we speak only about epistemic there is no real
problem since knowledge is indeed relative. However, if we speak about ontology this is a
non sense (this is also the main message of the Schrodinger cat paradox I think). But if we
follow Heisenberg and his quantum/classical ‘cut’ this conclusion is unavoidable. Ultimately,
the Universe as a whole becomes an issue. Does god existence (with a Ph.D) proven to be
necessary for collapsing the wave function of the Universe? This seems extremely difficult
to believe for me. This is an example of twilight zone which surrounds Bohr-Heisenberg
interpretation and this the reason why for me Bohmian is superior to Copenhagen. Still,
one could perhaps criticize Bohmian mechanics on a different level. I remind indeed that
for a non relativistic particle of mass m the pilot wave particle velocity is given by the de
Broglie guidance formula
d
dt
X(t) =
~
2mi
Ψ(X, t)∗
↔
∇ Ψ(X, t)/|Ψ(X, t)|2 = J(X, t)|Ψ(X, t)|2 (1)
where J is the Madelung probability current arising from Schro¨dinger equation. However,
from local conservation we have ∇ ·J(X, t)+∂t|Ψ(X, t)|2. It is thus clear that we can add a
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rotational ∇×C(X, t) to the current without changing the conservation. How could we be
sure that our velocity formula is the good one? Pilot wave can not answer that univocally
without calling to an other principle. For example one could try to invoke some Galilean or
Lorentzian symmetries or principles [12]. We could also invoke weak measurement or pro-
tective measurement for giving an empirical support to some Bohmian concept not anymore
so hidden. The answer to be given for this lack of univocity is not clear but for me it ac-
tually means that Bohmian mechanics is only a temporary expedient waiting for something
of better, i.e., for a theory in which the pilot wave dynamics will appear as a consequence
more than a postulate. An other element leads to the same conclusion: the wave acts on
the particle but the reciprocal is not true. Therefore, it seems that the Bohmian quantum
force is only an effective trick and that something of deeper is hidden here waiting for fur-
ther investigations and discoveries (may be along the path proposed by de Broglie with its
double solution program). I also mention a difficulty with the energy concept: For a general
quantum state the actual Bohmian Energy defined by E = −∂tS(X, t), where S/~ is the
wave function local phase, is not in general a constant even in the absence of any external
potential. It is for me very difficult to accept such a feature for a final theory: the total
energy should be a constant in the absence of external forces. Probably the energy definition
is not so good here. This again, motivates for further investigations beyond the pilot wave.
In the same vain, sometimes the Bohmians speak about ‘empty waves’ [13] when for example
a wave pack splits into several branches and when a particle chooses only one. The others
branches are clearly empty of particles but are the waves still there in the branches? If the
quantum potential has a reality independent of the particle the answer is ‘yes! certainly ’
but there is no proof of that and empty waves have not been directly detected yet. Once
again, I think these are strong arguments for going beyond the pilot wave approach and
that quantum mechanics will be superseded by something else (this was the conviction of
de Broglie by the way).
This is a long introduction to justify my quantum realist/determinist position. But it
serves only as a motivation for the next short section where I will describe the PBR theorem
and its relation with Bohmian mechanics. PBR is an important result obtained at the end of
2011 by Pusey Barret and Rudolph concerning the relation of epistemic and ontic in hidden
variable theories. In the long tradition started with Bell (or more honestly von Neumann)
its aims is to give experimental bounds to the allowed models that quantum realists can
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propose. Bell, focussed on non-locality, a feature of Bohmian mechanics, and PBR were
interested by the experimental definition of epistemic models. I will shortly review the PBR
result [1] (without the demonstration) and explains why pilot wave escapes the conclusions.
Still the theorem is true if we add an axiom. I actually found this rather simple result
already in 2011 immediately after that the preprint of PBR circulated on the web but the
work was published only later for editorial reasons. I also discussed this subject with M.
Leifer on his blog page early in 2012 [2] (but we disagreed on the conclusion as it is also
shown in his recent manuscript [14]: the current paper is also a kind of reply to him). For
more details on the proof the interested readers could find some of my earlier manuscripts
on Arxiv (see refs.[15, 16]) and compare with a independent work by M.Schlosshauer and
A. Fine [17] who clearly discovered the same result independently and simultaneously.
II. THE PBR RESULT AND ITS MEANING FOR A BOHMIAN
What is PBR theorem? the demonstration that epistemic models are forbidden in quan-
tum mechanics. Why epistemic models? Epistemic or knowledge interpretations have a long
tradition in quantum mechanics. Einstein was a strong defender of such approaches and for
him it meant that quantum mechanics was a kind of statistical mechanics like in the classical
world but waiting for something of better with a clean deterministic foundation (again like
classical mechanics). For Einstein, quantum mechanics was a bit like thermodynamics before
the works of Clausius, Maxwell and Boltzmann on statistical physics. Actually, this is not
really different from the de Broglie and Bohm point of view and we should not forget that
Einstein proposed already in 1907 that particle of light should be envisioned as a kind of
singularity riding atop a guiding electromagnetic field (this is the de double solution program
of de Broglie). De Broglie succeeded where Einstein failed and the pilot wave of de Broglie-
Bohm indeed justifies the existence of probability by a statistical mechanical argument like
Boltzmann or Gibbs did with Newton laws. By Epistemic models PBR meant actually a
sub-class of this kind of statistical model but they didn’t realize it in their paper. Before to
come to this let go to the first step of the PBR theorem which is purely quantum in the sense
of the formalism. In the simplest version PBR considered two non orthogonal pure quantum
states |Ψ1〉 = |0〉 and |Ψ2〉 = [|0〉 + |1〉]/
√
2 belonging to a 2-dimensional Hilbert space E
with basis vectors {|0〉, |1〉}. We will limit ourself to this example for the discussion since
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the details are not so important here. Using a specific measurement protocol M with basis
|ξi〉 (i ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4]) in E⊗ E which precise form is here irrelevant (see ref.[1]) PBR deduced
that 〈ξ1|Ψ1 ⊗ Ψ1〉 = 〈ξ2|Ψ1 ⊗ Ψ2〉 = 〈ξ3|Ψ2 ⊗ Ψ1〉 = 〈ξ4|Ψ2 ⊗ Ψ2〉 = 0. which means that
some probabilities cancel with such protocols. Now in order to see the contradiction we go
to the second step and try to introduce an hypothetical hidden variable model reproducing
the statistical features of quantum mechanics. This is clearly the classical methodology pro-
posed by Bell. Bell introduced ‘hidden variables’ λ which in the Bohmian language could be
the possible coordinates of the particles at the initial time. Here, I will be more precise that
PBR because I want to emphasize later some limitations on the reasoning. First, consider
a quantum state |Ψ〉 and an observable A with eigenvalue α. The probability of occurrence
for α will be given by
|〈α|Ψ〉|2 = P (α, a|Ψ) =
∫
P (α, a|λ)ρ(λ|Ψ)dλ. (2)
In this notation we introduced the hidden variable distribution ρ(λ|Ψ) and the conditional
probability P (α, a|λ) (such as ∑α P (α, a|λ) = 1 by definition of a conditional probability)
defining the ‘likehood’ for the system to evolve from its initial state (characterized by its
hidden variable λ, and its wave function) to a state where the eigenvalue α will be actualized
(i.e. after a projective measurement characterized by some external parameters a such as the
spin analyzer direction in a Stern Gerlach experiment). These definitions are very classical-
like since the dynamic or ‘ontic’ state should be decoupled from its epistemic counterpart in
agreement with the Boltzmann-Gibbs statistical approach. Of course, ρ(λ|Ψ) is supposed
to be independent of a since causality is expected to hold from past to future and if your
reject retro-causal, some ‘magical’ conspiracy or super deterministic approaches a` la Costa
de Beauregard or John Cramer (e.g., the very interesting transactional interpretation). Now,
in the PBR reasoning we should write
|〈ξi|Ψj ⊗Ψk〉|2 =
∫
PM(ξi|λ, λ′)̺j(λ)̺k(λ′)dλdλ′ (3)
where i ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4] and j, k ∈ [1, 2]. Actually, in their paper PBR didn’t use such notations
but these obviously simplify the reasoning like they did for Bell. In this PBR model there
is an independence criterion at the preparation since we write ̺j,k(λ, λ
′) = ̺j(λ)̺k(λ
′).
This is a very natural axiom and for example such an axiom would be justified in the
Bohmian interpretation where the hidden parameters are the initial coordinates X1(0) and
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X2(0) of the particles in the incident wave-packets (Although we are here speaking about
Q-bit this is not a problem: Bohm works also for spins but here the Q-bits could simply
belong to a sub-manifold of the full hilbert space like it is for instance with two-energy-
level systems. Therefore, spatial coordinates are still relevant). In these equations we
again introduced the conditional ‘transition’ probabilities PM(ξi|λ, λ′) for the outcomes ξi
supposing the hidden state λ, λ′ associated with the two independent Q-bits are given. The
fundamental point here is that PM(ξi|λ, λ′) is independent of Ψ1,Ψ2. Obviously, we should
have
∑i=4
i=1 PM(ξi|λ, λ′) = 1. It is then easy using all these definitions and conditions to
demonstrate that we must necessarily have
̺2(λ) · ̺1(λ) = 0 ∀λ, (4)
i.e., that ̺1 and ̺2 have nonintersecting supports in the λ-space. This constitutes the PBR
theorem for the particular case of independent prepared states Ψ1,Ψ2 defined before (but
PBR generalized their results for more arbitrary states using similar and astute procedures
described in ref. [1]). What are the implications of such a result? If we identify the conditions
imposed by PBR on the hidden variable models with what should be naturally expected
from any ontological model having a statistical ingredient, then we could conclude that
such models are nor really statistical. Indeed, from Eq. 4 we deduce that the density
of probabilities ̺Ψ1(λ) ̺Ψ2(λ) for any two quantum states Ψ1 and Ψ2 are necessarily not
overlapping in the λ−(phase) space. Therefore, it will be like if we have necessarily a delta
distributions δ3(q−X(t))δ3(p−P (t)) in classical mechanics. This kind of model could hardly
be called statistical at all? If this theorem is true (and mathematically it is) then it would
apparently make hidden variables completely redundant since it would be always possible to
define a relation of equivalence between the λ space and the Hilbert space: (loosely speaking,
we could in principle make the correspondence λ⇔ ψ). In other words, it would be as if λ
is nothing but a new name for Ψ itself!
However the PBR reasoning doesn’t fit with the Bohmian mechanics framework and
therefore it is not difficult to see that the reasoning obtained by PBR can not hold for such
a theory. First, observe that for pilot wave we have both X(t) and Ψ(X, t) as ontological
variables and since Born’s rule occurs then by definition ρΨ(X, t) = |Ψ(X, t)|2 defines in
the pilot wave model the probability of presence for the particle. If we consider the initial
state at the initial time t0 we have ρΨ(λ) := |Ψ(X, t0)|2. This is an epistemic distribution
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of hidden variables guided by the wavefunction Ψ(X, t). Clearly, for two given states Ψ1
and Ψ2 (orthogonal or not) we have in general ρΨ1(λ) · ρΨ2(λ) 6= 0 in contradiction with
Eq. 4 and PBR statement. To see why it is like that we first point out that Bohm model is
deterministic. Therefore, for a given λ0 := X(t0) we know that the evolution of the system
in a projective measurement will also be deterministic. After the measurement is done the
particle is actually in one of the allowed eigenvalues α0 (supposed discrete here for simplicity)
and we can write α0 = A(λ0, a,Ψ0). We should consequently write Eq. 2 with
P (α|a, λ,Ψ0) = δα,A(λ,a,Ψ0) = 0 or 1 (5)
where δ is the Kronecker symbol, since for one given λ only one trajectory is allowed (this
model of course satisfies trivially the condition
∑
α P (α|a, λ,Ψ0) = 1). Equivalently, the
actual value A(λ, a,Ψ0) =
∑
α αP (α|a, λ,Ψ0) can only takes one of the allowed eigenvalues
α associated with the hermitian operator A. Such kind of notations were used by Holland
in his book [3] (see also [18]). What is fundamental here is that Eq. 5 depends on Ψ0(the
initial wave function) in a explicit way. Still, beside this contextually the Bohm model is
a clean statistical model and there is no reason which can forbid us to call it an epistemic
model. This discussion shows however that pilot wave is not a banal classical model it
contains a wave function Ψ0 which have a particular status: it guides the particle and at the
same time it characterizes completely the statistical ensemble for a given protocol. While,
λ can fluctuate in the ensemble (corresponding to the different possible values for X(t0)) Ψ0
is instead a kind of dynamical constraint belonging to an ensemble like was the action or
the energy in the old Hamilton-Jacobi theory: Ψ guides the particles and characterize the
statistical ensemble [21]. Moreover, Eq. 2 is now modified and we should write
|〈α|Ψ〉|2 =
∫
δα,A(λ,a,Ψ0)ρ(λ|Ψ)dλ. (6)
to take into account Eq. 5. Clearly, this means that PBR Eq. 3 should be modified as well
to include this new contextual feature:
|〈ξi|Ψj ⊗Ψk〉|2 =
∫
PM(ξi|λ, λ′,Ψj,Ψk)̺j(λ)̺k(λ′)dλdλ′. (7)
However, now we have lost the secret ingredient allowing us to obtain Eq. 4 which implies
that the PBR derivation doesn’t hold anymore! (details are discussed elsewhere [15, 16].
Part of the language used here was also introduced long ago by Fine [22] and discussed by
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me in a different context [18, 23]). What does it mean? The ontic-epistemic framework used
by PBR suggested that there is a clean separation between ontic and epistemic approaches.
This is motivated by the PBR sentence ‘The statistical view of the quantum state is that
it merely encodes an experimenter’s information about the property of a system. We will
describe a particular measurement and show that the quantum predictions for this mea-
surement are incompatible with this view’ [1]. By ‘merely’ PBR meant certainly something
like classical statistical mechanics but what about Bohmian theory? Are they really ontic
for them? Does PBR simply ignore it? I found that suspicious since Harrrigan-Spekkens
start their paper [25] (cited in [1]) by the following definition: ‘We call a hidden variable
model ψ−ontic if every complete physical or ontic state in the theory is consistent with
only one pure quantum state; we call it ψ− epistemic if there exist ontic states that are
consistent with more than one pure quantum state’. Now, as explained, Bohmians proposed
since 1927 statistical interpretations where the wavefunction plays a dual role. Ψ guides
the particles but also justify the quantum statistical observations with some clear epistemic
elements. Clearly , for a Bohmian the wavefunction is definitely not only a simple label to
our epistemic knowledge but it is any way also such a label! In agreement with the previous
quotation I would thus say that pilot wave is in part also epistemic but this is not actually
the case in the ontological framework of these authors. They actually classified Bohmian
mechanics as ‘ψ-supplemented’ (a sub class of ‘ψ-ontic’) meaning that additionally to Ψ(x, t)
we must add some hidden supplementary variables X(t). Somehow, I could agree also with
this second definition which seems however to contradict my previous choice. So what! Is
Bohmian mechanics epistemic or ontic? This is very confusing (i.e., not only for me; see for
example Feintzeig [24] who is also clearly disturbed by that). Since, the paper [25] played an
important role in the work of PBR I think that there is a kind of language ambiguity in the
reasoning. May be, PBR could reply to the critics by saying like Leifer (in his analysis of the
work by me and M. Schlosshauer and A. Fine: ref. [14] pages 60-63): ‘if your conditional
probabilities for measurement outcomes depend on the wavefunction then the wave function
is ontic and there is nothing left to prove.’ I indeed received few emails along that direction.
However, for me the central point is not that the wave function is ontic (I have no doubt
about that: see the first sentence of this article), but that epistemic is not orthogonal to ontic
and that therefore the wave function is also an epistemic carrier. Interestingly, Leifer agrees
in the same paper that ‘the scope of the PBR theorem is restricted to the case where this
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conditional independence holds’. However he then adds: ‘ but this is part of the definition
of the term “ontic state”, rather than something than can be eliminated in order to arrive at
a more general notion of what it means for a model to be ψ−epistemic that still conveys the
same meaning’. In other words he recognizes that the PBR derivation doesn’t hold if you re-
ject the Ψ−independence in the conditional probabilities but that I modified the definition of
epistemic used by PBR. Clearly, we don’t have the same definition of what is to be ontic and
epistemic. For me Bohmian mechanics is both ontic and epistemic while for Leifer and some
others it is purely ontic. This looks like a old problem of semantic. Semantic plays indeed a
role in this debate. PBR, Leifer and others call ontic respectively what M. Schlosshauer and
A. Fine [17] called ’segregated models’ and ‘mixed models’. I clearly prefer the vocabulary
of M. Schlosshauer and A. Fine although personally I would simply use something like non
overlapping and overlapping distributions instead of segregated and mixed (this would agree
with the figure 1 of the PBR paper [1], see also [2]). Also, I completely agree with them [17]
when they wrote: ‘we find this terminology less charged than the terms “ψ-epistemic” and
“ψ-ontic” that PBR adopt from [25][my reference]’. In particular, epistemic is very much
charged in the context of probability theory where the objective or subjective nature of
the concept is often debated. Furthermore, in classical mechanics even a simple trajectory
is a solution of Liouville equation and corresponds to an ‘epistemic’ density of probabil-
ity ρ(q, p, t) = δ3N(q − X(t))δ3N (p − P (t)) associated with a perfect knowledge. For the
word ontic the situation is even worst. Ontic, is a philosophical word and its definition is a
bit like God: everyone knows what it means but nobody agrees...I suggest that the use of
such a charged vocabulary is responsible for the confusion surrounding this PBR theorem,
therefore semantic is indeed here a problem. In the same vain, I would like to precise that
I first learned about the PBR theorem version mainly through the Arxiv 2011 preprint of
the PBR manuscript (compare with the final manuscript [1]) and from the early pedagog-
ical presentation by Leifer [14], and Barrett (done at Oxford the 12th of March 2012 [26]).
In all these works, the authors clearly consider the opposition ontic-epistemic in the sense
segregated-mixed which is unambiguous. However, nowhere the postulate that P (α|a, λ)
should be independent of Ψ0 is even mentioned. This is the reason why I can fairly conclude
that they didn’t included this axiom in their reasoning. For example Barrett mentions at
slide 15 of his presentation that P (α|a, λ) is a natural axiom of Bell whereas Bell never pos-
tulated such a constraint. Furthermore, at slides 16-17 the opposition ontic⇔epistemic is
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done in such a way as to oppose the non-overlapping⇔overlapping distribution like if every
thing was there. But, since the missing postulate P (α|a, λ,Ψ0) ⇔ P (α|a, λ) is not men-
tioned it seems to play no role at all in the reasoning (this is not surprising since it doesn’t
appear either in the Harrigan-Spekkens paper [25]). However, once again, the opposition
P (α|a, λ,Ψ0) ⇔ P (α|a, λ) has a clear ontological and epistemic status (as important that
the one associated with the overlapping or non overlapping density of states) and it must
not be neglected otherwise the theorem is simply incomplete. We can also better appreciate
this point by comparing [1, 14, 26] with refs. [17, 22, 23] where a clear discussion of what
it means to include Ψ0 in the probability P (α|a, λ,Ψ0) is done.
My critical analysis of the PBR theorem was however not intended to be semantical.
It was not done for rejecting the complete PBR reasoning but only to show that the pre-
sentation of the theorem should be amended in order to make it general. The postulate
that P (α|a, λ,Ψ0) should be independent of Ψ0 is a critical part of the PBR derivation and
should be explicitly included in order to see the limitations of the theorem and re-enforces
his strength. Let me propose a version of the PBR theorem:
PBR theorem (amended version):
If P (α|a, λ,Ψ0) is independent of Ψ0 then Eq. 4 holds necessarily. In the opposite case this
is not necessarily true.
The inclusion of this additional postulate concerning conditional probabilities has important
consequences since it will shed some light on the properties of Bohmian mechanics (a bit
like Bell’s theorem did).
Consider, for example the simple beam-splitter experiment shown on Figure 1. If we send
a single photon state |Ψ1〉 through the input gate 1. The wave packet splits and we will
finish with a probability P (3|1) = 1/2 to detect the photon in the exit 3 and identically
P (4|1) = 1/2 of recording the photon in exit gate 4. Alternatively, we can consider a single
photon wave packet coming from gate 2 and at the end of the photon journey we will still
get P (3|1) = P (4|1) = 1/2. From the point of view of the hidden variable space we can
write
P (4|1 or 2) =
∫
P (3|λ)ρ(λ|Ψ1 or Ψ2) = 1/2 (8)
with ‘or’ meaning exclusiveness. Nothing can be said about the probabilities involved in the
integral. Now, if we consider superposed states such as |±〉 = [|Ψ1〉 ± i|Ψ2〉]/
√
2 the photon
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FIG. 1: An example showing that the ‘old’ axiomatic of PBR can not be applied to a Bohmian
like model. Cases A and B correspond to wave packets impinging from one of the 2 beam-splitter
entrances. Exits 3 and 4 are both allowed. In case C and D where a superposition of wave packets
interfere coherently the exits 4 and respectively 3 are forbidden. In Bohmian mechanics the hidden
variable distributions from examples A and B overlap nevertheless with those of example C and D
in contradiction with the PBR result (the problem is solved with the new axiomatic).
will finish either in gate 3 or 4 with probabilities P (3|+) = P (4|−) = 1 and P (4|+) =
P (3|−) = 0. We here find us in the orthogonal case of PBR theorem (i.e. 〈+|−〉 = 0)[16].
The deduction is thus straightforward and we get ρ(λ|+)ρ(λ|−) = 0 for all possible λ which
means that the two densities of probability for superposed states can not have any common
intersecting support in the λ-space. This is what we should conclude if we consider a model
accepting the PBR axiom P (α|a, λ).
However, this is not what happens in the pilot wave approach. In this model where the spatial
coordinates play a fundamental role we don’t have ρ(λ| + /−)ρ(λ|Ψ2) = 0 neither we have
ρ(λ|+ /−)ρ(λ|Ψ1) = 0 for every λ! Indeed, half of the relevant points of the wave packets +
or − are common to Ψ1 or Ψ2. Actually, this is even worst since we also have ρ(λ|+)ρ(λ|−) =
ρ(λ|±)2 6= 0 for every λ in the full λ-support (sum of the two disjoint supports associated
with Ψ1 and Ψ2). This is in complete contradiction with PBR theorem ‘old’ axiomatic (i.e.,
not the version presented by me page 13). This is not surprising if we remember that with
pilot wave we have P (α|a, λ,Ψ0) and not P (α|a, λ). For me what the PBR theorem shows is
that somehow those classical-like models obeying to the PBR constraint P (α|a, λ) can not
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reproduce wave particle duality: these models are therefore trivially useless. This is actually
not completely true because we are here sticking too much to the classical world with particle
coordinates etc... If you reject that classical framework you can still find some good models
reproducing the experiments and satisfying the PBR axiom P (α|a, λ) but they don’t look
at all like classical physics (see my proposals [15]). However, if you want to conserve some
classical features like paths and positions then you can use Bohmian mechanics but you
will now have P (α|a, λ,Ψ0) instead of P (α|a, λ)! Furthermore, the PBR theorem is for me
very useful since if we accept to include explicitly the missing axiom discussed before then
we deduce with PBR that the kind of ‘XIXth century like’ epistemic model (i.e., imposing
P (α|a, λ) but contradicting Eq. 4) are necessarily condemned.
What to conclude? I reviewed some of the fundamental aspects of the pilot wave approach
and I discussed the PBR theorem within this context. Bohmian mechanics is for me the best
available ontology, but it will certainly one day be superseded by a better theory justifying
some of its magical assumptions. In this context PBR’s theorem, like Bell’s one, is very
useful for discussing the pertinence of future and present hidden variable models. However,
this theorem should be formalized in order to discuss the best existing models (like the one
of de Broglie and Bohm) and therefore equipped with a satisfying axiomatic. When this
is done correctly the difficult discussion concerning ontic and epistemic becomes easier and
the theorem strength is nicely enforced.
Post-scriptum:
I would like to briefly discuss a consequence of the PBR theorem that M. Leifer [27]
called ‘the supercharged EPR argument’. This argument is also discussed in a recent paper
by G. Hetzroni and D. Rohrlich [28] (focussing on the relation between PBR and protective
measurement; see also S. Gao [29] on this topic). The argument runs as follows. Take an
EPR-like state i.e. a singlet state. This defines a pair of entangled Q-bits. Now, if you
project one of the two remote Q-bits ‘Alice’ along a basis (i.e., using a Bell procedure) the
second Q-bit ‘Bob’is projected in a specific state depending on the outcomes obtained for
Alice. However, if you admit the PBR theorem but only consider, like Leifer did, the cases
‘P (α|a, λ)’ (i.e. without the presence of Ψ0) then you could conclude the following: The
possible states of Bob are depending on the basis choices for Alice. These Bob states are
different and in agreement with PBR these can not overlap in the λ−space (see Eq. 4).
However, the basis choice for Alice can be done arbitrarily fast and therefore the Bob state
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will be collapsed with arbitrary huge velocity into its associated state. This would imply
non-locality and this without involving Bell theorem! This is very nice, but now we see the
interest of our new version of the PBR theorem: if we admit that the conditional probabilities
can depend on the quantum state Ψ0 the deduction doesn’t hold anymore because Eq. 4 is not
true. Still, the conclusion is perhaps correct because if ‘P (α|a, λ)’ becomes ‘P (α|a, λ,Ψ0)’
we have apriori a clear non local feature from the start (Bohmian mechanics is nonlocal
after all). In other words: projecting Bob in different states Ψi means different dynamics
‘P (α|a, λ,Ψi)’ which are enforced non locally by the projection of Alice outcomes. It can be
useful to be a bit more precise here. By ‘P (α|a, λ,Ψi)’ or ‘P (α|a, λ)’ I mean the equivalent
for the EPR case of the notation used in this paper. But, of course since we have two Q-bits
and two sets of measurements characterized by -for example- Stern and Gerlach directions
a (for Alice) and b (for Bob) we must precise a bit our notations. First, P (β, α|b, a) means
the probability for finding the system with outcome α = ±1 for Alice if her measurement
device is aligned along a and β = ±1 for Bob if his measurement device is aligned along b.
I will omit the Ψ0 notation for the singlet here since this is the same state during all the
reasoning. Then, using the λ notations we will get with Bell
P (β, α|b, a) =
∫
P (β, α|b, a, λ)ρ(λ)dλ. (9)
We assume that ρ(λ) is not depending on a, b because we don’t like retro-causality (those
who don’t agree could argue at that point) and we will therefore accept this simple causal
condition. Now, the EPR-Leifer-PBR measurement is made in two steps: first, Alice is
projected and we get α, then Bob and we get β. For this reason we can instead of Eq. 9
write
P (β, α|b, a) =
∫
P (β|α,b, a, λ)dP (α,b, a, λ)
=
∫
P (β|α,b, a, λ)P (α|b, a, λ)ρ(λ)dλ. (10)
Now, we have many probabilities. The first one from the right is ρ(λ) the density of probabil-
ity in the initial hidden variable space. The second is P (α|b, a, λ) the conditional probability
for going from the initial state to a state where Alice’s outcome is projected to α. This rig-
orously depends on a and b but like for ρ(b, a, λ) = ρ(λ) this will be simplified (using some
causality prerequisites in this reference frame) to P (α|b, a, λ) = P (α|a, λ) since the result
of Alice can not depend on the not yet realized outcome of Bob and device b if space like
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separation is considered. Again, this is not a very general hypothesis (no retro-causality) but
I only accept it in order to stick to the Bohmian framework. The last term is P (β|α,b, a, λ)
the conditional probability to get β for Bob knowing that we had α for Alice and that we
started from λ. This is the PBR probability discussed before. It depends on the quantum
state Ψi := |α〉 associated with the possible outcomes for Alice and depends also from the
axes directions a and b. But wait, how do I know that P (β|α,b, a, λ) should depend on a
and α ? No, problem guys: simply take Bell’s theorem with its non locality proof. From
Eqs. 9, 10 and Bell we have P (β, α|b, a, λ) = P (β|α,b, a, λ)P (α|a, λ) 6= P (β|b, λ)P (α|a, λ)
meaning that P (β|α,b, a, λ) should depends on a and α. A detailed calculation in the con-
text of Bohm theory would lead the same result. In other words accepting the different
causality axioms used here Bell theorem is necessary anyway to get non locality. Few addi-
tional remarks are here important. First, Leifer considered the case where the conditional
probabilities are not depending on the quantum state. From our own result this would
imply that P (β|α,b, a, λ) is independent from a and α in apparent contradiction with Bell!
However, this is not the case since it is not actually necessary to remove the dependence
on a: only |α〉 should be removed (in agreement with Leifer choice) so that Bell is safe and
indeed non-locality holds. Therefore, from this reasoning it is difficult for me to see PBR
as kind of proto-theorem able to create a ‘supercharged EPR argument’ since Bell is with
us all along. A second remark concerns ‘wave function collapse’ in the regime involving
Bohmian mechanics. Einstein, de Broglie, and Bohm didn’t like the wave function collapse:
it looked as magic. Unless we introduce a nonlinear process, like GRW did, this is not
physical. In the theory of de Broglie and Bohm there is no wave collapse. The different
branches of the measuring process are all playing a role even those with an ‘empty wave’.
Still, in the effective this is the same because the entanglement process between Alice and
Bob breaks the coherence between the different possible states of Bob if one do a projective
measurement on Alice. Every thing will be like if we have a statistical mixture which is
somehow equivalent to a collapse since the quantum nature of the motion is now erased (in
the sense of a ‘which-path’ experiment). Finally, I would like to point out that non-locality
is in the current Bohmian theory a very curious thing. It clearly involves a kind of privileged
reference frame or ‘Aether’ with a specific space-time foliation (see for example [30]). This
is not really covariant and we have the feeling to return to the Lorentz-Poincare´’s time when
the relativity principle was clearly defined but when people tried to save a privileged frame
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anyway. For me this again motivates researches for a better theory.
I would like to thank M. Leifer, and the PBR authors for very interesting discussions in
2012. I would like to thank the CNRS for giving me the possibility to make at the same
time experimental /theoretical physics in such ‘fashionable topics’ like quantum-plasmonics
[31] and letting me the opportunity to do fundamental physics.
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